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On January 12, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court found the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional as applied and
then, by judicially amending the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,1
transformed the Guidelines from a mandatory to an "effectively
advisory" system.2 Some observers greeted the decision in United
States v. Booker as a sort of Emancipation Proclamation for federal
sentencing judges,3 making 2005 a juridical Year of Jubilee.4 Others,
notably federal prosecutors and some in Congress, have reacted
with a marked lack of enthusiasm,' viewing Booker less as an
emancipation of repressed jurists and more as a release of the beast
of unfettered judicial discretion among the orderly flocks of
defendants being shepherded through the federal criminal system
toward a Guidelines sentence.
1. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
2. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 743 (2005).
3. Federal District Judge Nancy Gertner characterizes at least the more exuberant
judges in this camp as the "'free at last'" group. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When
Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569, 579 (2005).
4. The notion of a Year of Jubilee originates in the story of the Israelites' flight
from Egypt, during which God tells Moses that the fiftieth year after the Israelites enter
the land he will give them should be declared a "jubilee," during which the people
"shall ... proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants." Leviticus 25:10-17.
The idea of jubilee was adopted by African-American slaves to describe the time of their
release from bondage, appearing in spirituals, see, e.g., Rise and Shine, in JOHN
BARTLErr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 935 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980) ("Rise and
shine and give God the glory[,] For the year of Jubilee."), and at least one song of the Civil
War era written by a white abolitionist, HENRY CLAY WORK, Marching Through Georgia,
in SONGS 17, 19-20 (1974) ("Hurrah! Hurrah! we bring the Jubilee! Hurrah! Hurrah! the
flag that makes you free! So we sang the chorus from Atlanta to the sea, While we were
marching through Georgia."). For the complete lyrics of Marching Through Georgia, and
biographical information about its composer, see generally HENRY CLAY WORK, SONGS,
supra.
5. For example, Rep. Thomas Feeney (R. Fla.) called Booker "'an egregious overreach
into Congress' constitutional power' that 'flies in the face of the clear will of Congress' that the
sentencing guidelines be mandatory." Dan Christensen, The Short Life of the Feeney
Amendment, DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 24, 2005, available at httpJ/www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1105968948840 (quoting Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Feeney
Comments on Supreme Court Sentencing Ruling (Jan. 12, 2005), available at
http'Jhvww.house.gov/appsflist/press/fl24-feeney/SupremeCourtOpinion.html).
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This Article is not about the theoretical merits of Booker,6 but
about its immediate effects. It examines the available statistics on
sentencings in federal district court from January 13, 2005 through
December 21, 2005,' and attempts to answer four empirical
questions: (1) What effect did Booker have on the proportion of cases
sentenced within the applicable guideline range? (2) To the extent
that the proportion of sentences within the guideline range has
declined in the wake of Booker, which sentencing actors-judges or
prosecutors-are primarily responsible for the decline? (3) What
effect has the Booker decision had on the severity of sentences
imposed in federal court? (4) What effect has Booker had on regional
sentencing disparity in the federal courts? Because the answers to
these questions may have considerable impact on the current
debate about what, if any, action should be taken by Congress or
the Sentencing Commission in response to Booker, this Article
concludes with some reflections on what the available data means
and how policymakers should think about the questions it raises.
I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING STORY BEFORE BOOKER
The Booker decision and its aftermath can only be understood
as part of a longer story about the institutional competition for
control of the federal sentencing process among Congress, the
central administration of the Justice Department, local U.S.
6. There already exists a flourishing literature analyzing the Booker decision and
its immediate predecessors, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.") and Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538, 2543 (2004)
(striking down Washington's sentencing guideline system as violative of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury). See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From
Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58
STAN. L. REV. 195 (2005) (reviewing the potential pitfalls Apprendi presents to
substantive criminal law); M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After
Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for Juries,
56 S.C. L. REv. 533 (2005) (examining the implications of Blakely and advocating changes
designed to protect defendants' Sixth Amendment jury rights and ensure uniformity in
sentencing); Margareth Etienne, Into the Briar Patch?: Power Shifts Between Prosecution
and Defense After United States v. Booker, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 741 (2005) (arguing that the
Court's solution in Booker is the best possible remedy for federal sentencing problems).
My contributions to this metastasizing genre include Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond
Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 149 [hereinafter Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids], Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr.
Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58
STAN. L. REV. 235 (2005) [hereinafter Bowman, Time Machine], and Frank 0. Bowman,
III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid
Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2004).
7. For a description of the data analyzed in this Article and a discussion of the
limitations of that data, see Part II.B.1.
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Attorney's Offices, federal trial and appellate judges, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, and the federal defense bar. The full tale is
beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief synopsis will suffice to
set the stage.
Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(SRA) and the subsequent adoption of the Guidelines in 1987,
sentencing authority over federal defendants rested primarily with
federal judges and the U.S. Parole Commission. Judges had
virtually unlimited discretion to impose a sentence within broad
upper and lower limits set by statute.8 Once a sentence was
imposed, if it included a term of imprisonment, the Parole
Commission had significant discretionary power to determine the
length of time actually served through the exercise of its parole
release authority.9 Federal prosecutors could influence sentences to
some degree through their charging authority and plea bargaining
power, but once the offense or offenses of conviction were set, they
could do little to influence sentences imposed or served beyond
arguing that judges or the Parole Commission should exercise their
sentencing discretion in a particular way. Congress influenced
sentence lengths in broad strokes by defining crimes and setting
statutory maximum and minimum sentences, but otherwise
customarily left the details of sentencing to the judicial and parole
systems.' °
For a variety of reasons-which included concern that
unbridled judicial sentencing discretion combined with
prosecutorial plea bargaining power was generating unwarranted
disparity, distrust of the hidden back-end discretionary authority of
parole officials, and, in some quarters, the view that lazy
prosecutors, soft judges, and unresponsive parole officials were
together letting dangerous criminals get away with unduly lenient
sentences-the former regime of broad sentencing discretion was
found to be deficient." Accordingly, the SRA abolished federal
8. As Judge Marvin E. Frankel said of the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing
system, "[T]he almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the
fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion
to the rule of law." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5
(1973).
9. The powers of the Parole Commission as it existed immediately before the
adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218
(2000), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(7), 98
Stat. 1987, 2027.
10. For a more complete discussion of the spheres of congressional and judicial
sentencing power before and after the Guidelines, see Bowman, Time Machine, supra note
6, at 237-43.
11. For discussions of the dissatisfactions with the pre-Guidelines federal
sentencing system that led to the adoption of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),
282 [43:2
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parole altogether, 12 substituting a requirement that defendants
must serve at least 85% of their stated sentences before becoming
eligible for release."3 The Act also replaced largely unfettered front-
end judicial discretion with a guidelines system. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were designed to cabin, though not to
eliminate, the sentencing discretion of federal district judges. Their
designers accomplished this end by creating a complex grid of
sentencing ranges and a complex set of rules for placing defendants
within these ranges based on post-conviction judicial findings of
fact, by mandating that defendants be sentenced within the
applicable ranges absent unusual circumstances meriting a
"departure," and by delegating to appellate courts the authority to
police compliance with the rules through the process of appellate
review.'4 Before Booker, the Guidelines were not really "guidelines"
as a layman would understand the term,'5 but a form of positive
law, binding on federal trial and appellate judges alike. 6
Notably, the SRA and the Guidelines placed no formal legal
constraints on prosecutorial charging or plea bargaining discretion.
However, recognizing that prosecutors could effectively dictate
sentencing outcomes through charge bargaining if guideline
sentences were based entirely on the charge or charges of
conviction, the original Sentencing Commission structured the
see Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons
in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 680-89
[hereinafter Bowman, Quality of Mercy], and Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of
Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
12. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(7), 98
Stat. 2027.
13. An inmate can earn up to fifty-four days of good time credit per year beginning
at the end of the first year of his term. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2000); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3), introductory cmt. (2003) (noting that
Congress's sentencing policy sought to abolish "good time" credits).
14. This is, of necessity, an abbreviated description of the pre-Booker federal
sentencing guidelines system. For a more complete account, see Bowman, Quality of
Mercy, supra note 11, at 689-704.
15. An illustration of this point from popular culture is the response of Captain
Barbossa, in the film The Pirates of the Caribbean, to his captive's plea to apply the
"Pirate's Code": "First, your return to shore was not part of our negotiations or our
agreement, so I must do nothin'. And secondly, you must be a pirate for the pirate's code
to apply and you're not. And thirdly, the code is more what you call guidelines than actual
rules. Welcome aboard the Black Pearl, Miss Turner." Wikiquote, Pirates of the
Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Pirates-of the_
Caribbean:_The_Curseof.theBlackPearl (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (emphasis added)
(quoting THE PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN (Walt Disney Pictures 2003)).
16. United States v. Kloda, 133 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, a judge must be concerned with positive law, and only indirectly
with philosophies ofjust punishment and compassion.").
2006] 283
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Guidelines as a so-called "modified real offense system." 7 In this
system, the judge calculates the presumptive sentencing range
based on numerical values assigned to the offense(s) of conviction
and to a variety of facts that are not themselves elements of the
offense(s) of conviction.18 The non-element facts are found by the
judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard. 9 The result
is that a defendant's sentencing range is in large measure
determined by facts neither found by a jury nor expressly admitted
to by the defendant-so-called "relevant conduct.""
Everyone recognized from the outset that the effectiveness of
the relevant conduct rules in constraining prosecutorial power
rested in large measure on the continuing commitment of the
Justice Department and individual prosecutors to providing
sentencing courts with full and accurate information and the
continuing resolve of judges to insist on full prosecutorial
disclosure.2' The Justice Department has, since the advent of the
Guidelines, maintained policies requiring that prosecutors charge
and accept pleas only to the most serious readily provable offense
and provide full and accurate disclosure to courts of facts relevant to
sentencing.22 However, the phrasing of the official formulations of
these policies has been modified several times by different
administrations to reflect greater or lesser toleration of
prosecutorial bargaining discretion.23
Once the Guidelines went into full force (which did not occur
nationally until after the Supreme Court affirmed their
constitutionality in 1989),24 their effect, in combination with various
statutory minimum mandatory sentences Congress enacted in the
17. For a description and defense of the Guidelines' modified real offense structure,
see Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-
Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997).
18. Id. at 1354-61.
19. Id. at 1388.
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.3 (2005). For discussion of the
rationale for and operation of the relevant conduct rules, see William W. Wilkins, Jr. &
John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
41 S.C. L. REV. 495 (1990).
21. The primary institutional check on prosecutorial manipulation of sentencing
facts has been the U.S. Probation Office, an agency within the Judicial Branch whose
officers are charged with investigating and reporting sentencing facts in the presentence
investigation report. For discussion of this role of probation officers, see Bowman, Quality
of Mercy, supra note 11, at 730-32.
22. Id. at 727-28.
23. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (recounting the fluctuations in
prosecutorial bargaining discretion associated with changes of administration).
24. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (finding constitutional
Congress's delegation of the guidelines development task to the Judicial Branch).
[43:2284
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late 1980s for drug offenses,25 was pronounced. The percentage of
federal defendants sentenced to a purely probationary sentence fell
from roughly 48% in 1984,26 to 14% in 1992.27 Within only a few
years, the length of imposed sentences was nearly triple the average
prevailing before the SRA.2' Furthermore, because the SRA
abolishes parole and requires defendants to serve at least 85% of
the prison term imposed, the amount of time actually spent in
prison has increased even more than the length of the sentences
nominally imposed.29 As a consequence, since the 1980s, the federal
inmate population has increased by more than 600%."0
As the 1990s progressed, however, both the degree of
adherence to the Guidelines and the overall severity of the
sentences imposed gradually declined. From 1990-1996, the
percentage of cases sentenced within the applicable guideline range
fell from 83.4% to 69.6%."' The average term of imprisonment
imposed on federal defendants peaked in 1992 at 66.9 months, but
25. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100
Stat. 3207, 3207-2 (adopting, inter alia, a stringent regime of quantity-based mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenses). For discussion of the effect of the ADAA on the
structure of the drug provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and on drug
sentence severity in the federal courts, see Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet
Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOwA L.
REv. 1043 (2001).
26. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT
ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY
IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA
BARGAINING 58 fig.14 (1991) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1991 STUDY].
27. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 61 fig.D [hereinafter 1992
REPORT].
28. From 1984 to 1990, the mean sentence imposed by judges for all federal crimes
increased from 24 months to 46 months. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1991 STUDY, supra
note 26, at 60. By 1993, the mean sentence imposed increased by almost another 50% to
66.9 months. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 61 fig.F, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1995/annf 95.pdf [hereinafter 1995 REPORT].
29. For example, a federal defendant sentenced to ten years in 1986 would, on
average, have served slightly less than six years before release on parole. Today, a
defendant sentenced to ten years will serve 8.5 years before release. See Paul J. Hofer &
Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence Severity: 1980-1998, 12 FED.
SENT'G REP. 12, 13 (1999) (reporting that offenders sentenced prior to the passage of the
SRA on average served 58% of their term, whereas offenders sentenced after the SRA's
enactment serve between 87-100% of their term).
30. Compare ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K. GILLIARD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 1994, at 1 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pi94.pdf
(tallying 24,363 federal prison inmates in 1980), with PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J.
BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2002, at 1 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p02.pdf (tallying 163,528 federal prison inmates in
2002).
31. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 39 fig.G [hereinafter 1996 SOURCEBOOK].
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by 1996 had dropped to 62.2 months.32 In 1996, the Supreme Court
decided Koon v. United States, which loosened the standard of
appellate review of district court departures from the Guidelines33
and which was widely interpreted as signaling encouragement or at
least increased tolerance of departures. From 1996 until the end of
the Clinton Administration in 2000, the proportion of sentences
imposed within the applicable guideline range continued to fall,
from 69.6% in 1996 to 64.5% in 2000.14 Average sentence length
continued to decline as well, from 62.2 months in 1996 to 55.1
months in 2000.
Prosecutorial policies and behavior plainly contributed to the
downward trend in guidelines compliance and average sentence
length during the 1990s. Indeed, very early in the history of the
Guidelines, the government became the primary initiator of
downward departures through motions for sentence reductions
based on cooperation ("substantial assistance departures"), as well
as requests for departure on other grounds agreed to in plea
negotiations. 36 For example, by 1995, one in every five federal
defendants was the beneficiary of a substantial assistance
departure.7 Similarly, whereas the Justice Department of the first
President Bush emphasized vigorous charging and bargaining
policies and strongly discouraged prosecutorial fact bargaining or
manipulation, the Clinton Justice Department under Attorney
General Reno adhered to the same general line, but in 1993 relaxed
its policies somewhat to permit greater local and individual
prosecutorial autonomy.38 My colleague Michael Heise and I have
32. Id. at 23 fig.E.
33. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97-100 (1996).
34. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS fig.G, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/fig-g.pdf [hereinafter
2000 SOURCEBOOK].
35. See id. at fig.E, available at http'//www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/fig-e.pdf.
36. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial
Revolt on "Substantial Assistance" Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial
Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 13-15, 15 n.44 (1999).
37. 1995 REPORT, supra note 28, at 89 tbl.31, available at http//www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/1995/anntb95.pdf (reporting that 19.7% of federal defendants convicted in 1995
received a substantial assistance departure).
38. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh issued the first policy statements on
Guidelines practice by federal prosecutors. See Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh,
U.S. Att'y Gen., to U.S. Attorneys on Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989),
reprinted in 1 FED. SENT'G REP. 421-22 (1989) ("The basic policy is that charges are not to
be bargained away or dropped, unless the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the
government's ability readily to prove a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons .... The
Department's policy is only to stipulate to facts that accurately represent the defendant's
conduct."). In 1993, Attorney General Reno issued her own statement containing language
clearly intended to give prosecutors somewhat more leeway than had been the case under
the Bush Administration:
286 [43:2
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examined the decline in the length of federal drug sentences during
the 1990s and concluded that it resulted in significant part from the
exercise of discretionary choices by both prosecutors and judges."
This having been said, a thorough and nuanced explanation for
the drops in the overall guideline compliance rate and the average
sentence length during the 1990s is beyond the scope of this Article.
Likewise, this Article expresses no view on the desirability of the
declines in guidelines compliance and sentence severity in this
period. The important point for present purposes is not so much the
actual cause or substantive merit of the declines as the
consternation they caused among some in Congress and some
conservative observers of federal sentencing.
For some members of Congress, the gradual erosion of judicial
adherence to guideline ranges was seen as an implicit rejection of
congressional policy choices favoring stringent sentences as a
centerpiece of national crime policy, and thus as a challenge to
congressional authority. For the Department of Justice as a whole,
the judiciary's increasingly assertive embrace of the departure
power not only produced some sentences that prosecutors thought
unduly low, but also reduced prosecutorial control over sentencing
outcomes, thereby reducing the government's leverage in
negotiations for guilty pleas and cooperation."
It should be emphasized that charging decisions and plea agreements
should reflect adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines. However, a faithful and
honest application of the Sentencing Guidelines is not incompatible with
selecting charges or entering into plea agreements on the basis of an
individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the
specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purposes of the federal
criminal code, and maximize the impact of federal resources on crime.
Memorandum from Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Holders of U.S. Attorneys' Manual,
Title 9, on Principles of Federal Prosecution (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SEN'G
REP. 352 (1994).
The Reno Memo drew from Senator Orrin G. Hatch an immediate and
disapproving response in the form of a letter to the Attorney General. See Letter from
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm., to Janet Reno, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Jan. 13, 1994), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 353 (1994). Attorney General
Reno replied with a letter that appeared to disavow any intention to change previous
policy. See Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking
Member, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 8, 1994), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 353
(1994). The result appeared to be a reversion to previous policy, at least in form. See
James K. Bredar & Jeffrey E. Risberg, The Reno Retreat: New Department of Justice
"Bluesheet" DOA, 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 313, 314 (1994) (contending that the net result of
the Hatch-Reno exchange was a retreat by the Department to the position of the
Thornburgh Memo).
39. See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical
Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87
IOWA L. REV. 477, 554-58 (2002).
40. See William W. Mercer, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Mont. & Paul K Charlton, U.S.
Attorney, Dist. of Ariz., Testimony Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 7-9 (Mar. 25,
HeinOnline  -- 43 Hous. L. Rev. 287 2006-2007
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Of course, judges were by no means the sole source of sentences
outside the guideline range. As noted above, it is clear that, over
time, U.S. Attorneys' Offices and individual prosecutors came to
employ a wide array of techniques to facilitate sentences lower than
the Guidelines strictly applied would call for.4' For an influential
group of political appointees who entered the Department of Justice
in the second Bush Administration, the number of departures being
requested or acquiesced in by prosecutors, as well as the other non-
departure guideline manipulation techniques employed by
prosecutors to facilitate pleas, were troublesome. The new
appointees were concerned that the combined effect of judicial and
prosecutorial behavior created unjustifiable inter-district
sentencing disparities, undercut the federal crime control program
by reducing sentence lengths, and subverted the plain meaning of
the law.42
The confluence of administration and congressional concern
produced a number of policy changes and at least one controversial
legislative enactment. First, by all accounts, early in its tenure the
central administration of the new Bush Justice Department began
promoting aggressive prosecution, tough charging and plea
bargaining policies, and increased adherence to the Guidelines.43
Second, in 2003, Congress passed the Feeney Amendment to the so-
called PROTECT Act, a provision that legislatively reversed the
Koon decision, thus reinstating a tighter standard of appellate
review of district court departures, and directed the Commission to
2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/3-25_03/DOJtest.pdf [hereinafter
Testimony of Mercer and Charlton] (disapproving what the Department of Justice viewed
as the judiciary's excessive use of downward departures).
41. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (describing the means
prosecutors employed to alleviate burdens placed on their sentencing control by the
Guidelines).
42. One of the primary architects of Bush's Justice Department policies on
Guidelines matters has been William W. Mercer, U.S. Attorney for the District of
Montana. Mr. Mercer's concern about guidelines compliance is evident in his public
statements and occasional writings. See, e.g., Testimony of Mercer and Charlton, supra
note 40, at 7-9; William W. Mercer, Assessing Compliance with the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines: The Significance of Improved Data Collection and Reporting, 16 FED. SENT'G
REP. 43, 46 (2003) (remarking that downward departure data suggests "the fundamental
principle of the SRA... is in jeopardy").
43. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious
History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 373,
411-31 (2004) (analyzing how the Bush Justice Department pushed for tougher penalties
for economic crime in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); Testimony of Mercer
and Charlton, supra note 40, at 2-4 (urging the Commission to "heed the voices of the
President and Congress" by significantly increasing fraud guideline penalties).
44. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m), 117 Stat. 650, 675.
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amend the Guidelines to further limit departures (which it did).45
Shortly after the passage of the PROTECT Act, Attorney General
Ashcroft issued an internal Justice Department policy
memorandum reemphasizing the importance of prosecutorial
adherence to the Guidelines.46 As we will see below, these changes
in law and policy had observable effects on sentencing patterns from
2001 to 2004.47
It was against this background of intense institutional
struggle over sentencing policy that the Supreme Court decided
first Blakely v. Washington in June 2004, in which the
constitutionality of the Guidelines was cast into doubt,48 and then
United States v. Booker in January 2005, in which the formerly
mandatory guidelines were, with a touch of the judicial wand,
rendered "effectively advisory."'5 The transformation generated
both an immense amount of immediate labor, as lawyers and
courts struggled to interpret and apply the Booker decision, ° and
an upwelling of uncertainty, hope, and concern about what the
future would bring. To somewhat oversimplify a complex and
evolving debate, there are at present three bodies of opinion
about Booker. One group (which includes many federal judges
and members of the defense bar) feels that the post-Booker
advisory regime, though not ideal, is an improvement over the
pre-Booker mandatory guidelines and is in any event far
preferable to any replacement regime likely to be advanced by
the current Congress and Administration.5' A second group
(which includes some important Republican congressmen and
central decisionmakers in the Justice Department) is profoundly
45. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 5K2.0 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002suppc/OCTO3CON.pdf (listing
instances in which departures from the sentencing guidelines are prohibited).
46. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., to All Federal
Prosecutors on Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of
Charges, and Sentencings (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.crimelynx.com/
ashchargememo.html (regarding the PROTECT Act and reaffirming "Congress' intention
that the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines be faithfully and
consistently enforced"); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9-2.170(B), available at httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia -reading-room/
usamltitle9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.170 ("United States Attorneys' Offices... should report all
adverse, appealable district court decisions to the Appellate Section ...
47. See infra text accompanying notes 117-122.
48. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004).
49. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005).
50. See Nancy J. King, Reasonableness Review After Booker, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 325
(2006) (commenting on the developing reasonableness standard in appellate review of
federal sentences).
51. See James G. Carr, Some Thoughts on Sentencing Post-Booker, 17 FED. SENTG
REP. 295, 295 (2005) (urging those who prefer expanded judicial discretion in sentencing
decisions to defend against advocates of the reinstitution of the pre-Booker system).
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dismayed by Booker because it views the Court's decision as a
challenge to congressional authority over sentencing policy and to
prosecutorial dominance of sentencing practice.52 It suspects that
Booker will produce markedly lower judicial compliance with the
Guidelines, and as a result, federal sentences that will become
progressively less stringent and more disparate.53 Those in the
second group are likely to favor a legislative response to Booker-
one that would, so far as now constitutionally possible, reinstate a
facsimile of the pre-Booker guidelines system. The third group is
comprised of those who believe that the pre-Booker federal
sentencing system was significantly flawed, but do not view the
post-Booker advisory system as a viable long-term replacement and
thus hope the systemic disruption caused by Booker will provide an
occasion for fundamental reform.54
Essential to an intelligent debate between these groups is an
accurate understanding of Booker's real-world effects. If judges have
largely abandoned reliance on the Guidelines and now routinely
impose sentences outside guideline limits, and if in consequence
sentences are either markedly more lenient or markedly more
disparate, then those who want immediate legislation effectively
restoring the old regime have gained a powerful argument. If, on
the other hand, judges continue to behave much as they did before,
generally imposing sentences in accordance with the Guidelines and
keeping sentence lengths and sentencing disparity much the same,
then those who argue for continued application of the advisory
system have arrows in their quiver. The next section evaluates the
available evidence on these issues.
II. THE EXTENT AND CAUSES OF CHANGES IN GUIDELINES
COMPLIANCE AFTER BOOKER
A. The Problem of Quantifying the Exercise of Sentencing
Discretion
Booker undeniably conferred additional sentencing discretion
on federal district judges. It may or may not have reduced the
52. See Christensen, supra note 5 (criticizing judicial activism in sentencing
guidelines as overreaching into Congress' constitutional power); Alberto Gonzales, U.S.
Att'y Gen., Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm) (opining that the
sentencing system works best when judicial discretion is bound by mandatory guidelines).
53. See Gonzales, supra note 52.
54. See Bowman, Time Machine, supra note 6, at 256-58 (critiquing the advisory
guidelines system as an unsustainable solution under political fire from, among others,
Attorney General Gonzales).
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degree of discretionary authority exercised by prosecutors over
sentencing outcomes. The difficult problem is quantifying Booker's
effect. The difficulty flows from several sources. First among these
is the near-impossibility of measuring an increase or decrease in
something as amorphous as "discretion." Discretion is another word
for power-power to make certain kinds of decisions. In the
sentencing context, judicial discretion means the power of a district
judge to select a punishment for one convicted of crime
unconstrained by a priori rules or post hoc appellate review.
Conversely, prosecutorial sentencing discretion means the power to
impose limits on judicial sentencing discretion in individual cases
through charging decisions, plea agreements, departure motions,
evidentiary presentations in support of guideline facts, and other
mechanisms. Assigning numerical values to these exercises of
power is difficult.
Quantifying the relative amount of discretion enjoyed by actors
in different sentencing systems is a particularly tricky proposition.
For example, the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines system was built
around a sentencing grid consisting of 258 sentencing ranges
designed to fall inside of and to be narrower than the ranges set by
statute for conviction of crimes.55 Once a judge made the post-
conviction findings of guideline facts necessary to generate a
guideline sentencing range, he or she could sentence anywhere
within the guideline range but could not sentence outside the range
unless the defendant qualified under standards delineated by
statute, guidelines, and case law for a departure.56 This system
plainly decreased judicial discretion relative to the almost purely
discretionary system that preceded the Guidelines, but it is difficult
to quantify the decrease. One might compare the width of statutory
sentencing ranges to the width of guideline ranges and pronounce
that judicial discretion was reduced in exact proportion to the
reduction in the width of the range within which judges could select
sentences at will, but such an approach would plainly oversimplify
the picture. Even under the Guidelines, judges retained the power
to impose sentences throughout the full extent of the statutory
range, subject to the limitations of the departure rules (which, in
the case of certain classes of departures, require a government
motion). By the mid-1990s, judges, often in cooperation with
prosecutors, were exercising the departure power in roughly one-
55. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1333-34 (2005).
56. See id. at 1326, 1334-35.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005).
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third of all cases.58 Thus, granting that the Guidelines decreased
judicial sentencing discretion relative to the pre-Guidelines system,
it is difficult to say by how much.
The quantification difficulty exists even when comparing
degrees of discretion in different sentencing systems of the same
basic type. Consider the Guidelines before and after Booker. Booker
did not abolish the Guidelines. 9 Neither did it render them
voluntary, in the sense that judges may choose to employ them or
not."° Rather, it appears that judges still must make post-conviction
findings of guideline facts"' and must apply the Guidelines' rules to
determine a sentencing range, just as they did before Booker.6"
District judges have an increased measure of power to impose a
sentence outside that range and appellate judges have less power to
insist that a sentence within the range is the correct one. In post-
Booker case law, the debate about how much power district judges
have gained is expressed in disputes over the weight that should be
accorded the Guidelines by district and appellate judges. Some
courts say that the Guidelines should be accorded "heavy weight";3
others say the Guidelines are but one co-equal factor among a
number listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).64 Some courts suggest that a
sentence within the guideline range is presumptively a reasonable
58. See infra p. 301 fig.2. Judicial power to affect sentencing outcomes was not
limited to the powers of departure and selection of a sentence within the applicable
guideline range. In addition, the obligation to make post-conviction findings of guideline
facts carried with it a de facto discretionary power to influence sentencing outcomes
through decisions on disputed facts.
59. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2005).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 112; see also United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (11th Cir.
2005) (examining a district court's grant of a sentence departure based on its findings of a
combination of guideline facts).
62. See United States v. Pepper, 412 F.3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[Clalculating
the guidelines sentence remains an important part of the sentencing decision after United
States v. Booker, even when a departure is involved" (citation omitted)); Crawford, 407
F.3d at 1181-83 (reversing for resentencing where district judge relied on legally
impermissible grounds in granting a departure); United States v. Schlifer, 403 F.3d 849,
854-55 (7th Cir. 2005) (remanding for resentencing because of a "misapplication of the
guidelines").
63. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1286-87 (D. Utah
2005).
64. See, e.g., Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112-13 (finding that sentencing judges must
"consider" the Guidelines together with other factors listed in § 3553(a)). Judge Tjoflat of
the Eleventh Circuit has suggested that a judge may sentence outside the guideline range
because he or she disagrees with the Commission's policy judgment in setting guideline
ranges for particular offenses or offenders, but that position has not so far been adopted
by his court. United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261, 1287-89 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat,
J., dissenting). See generally Gertner, supra note 3 (discussing the status of Guidelines
post-Booker).
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one;"5 others say not so;"6 and the Sixth Circuit cannot seem to make
up its mind." For the would-be empiricist, the problem with these
debates is that, while the choice of verbal formula may give a sort of
directional signal (i.e., if the Guidelines are to be accorded "great
weight" or a presumption of reasonableness, the amount of
additional discretion granted by Booker is relatively small, while if
the Guidelines are only one factor among several, the amount of
discretion granted by Booker is somewhat greater), verbal formulas
cannot quantify how much more discretion judges have after
Booker.
One saving grace of the Booker remedial opinion from the point
of view of the empirically inclined is that, because Booker left the
Guidelines themselves intact, albeit advisory, judges and
prosecutors are working within the same procedural framework
now as they were before, and thus we can more readily compare
before and after behavior. Both before and after Booker judges
found facts and employed the Guidelines' rules to calculate
sentencing ranges. Likewise, the rules governing sentence
reductions based on cooperation with the government ("substantial
assistance departures") and participation in early disposition
65. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
a sentence within properly calculated guidelines range "is afforded a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness"); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir.
2006) (holding that a "sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness"); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d
449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a sentence "within the properly calculated
Guidelines range.., is presumptively reasonable'" (quoting United States v. Newsom,
428 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2005))); United States v. Cawthorn, 429 F.3d 793, 802 (8th
Cir. 2005) ("When a defendant's sentence is within the guidelines range, it is
presumptively reasonable."); United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005)
([A] sentence imposed within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1182 (2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d
606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The best way to express the new balance [created by Booker], in
our view, is to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly calculated under the
Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.").
66. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting per
se presumption of reasonableness of within-range sentence); United States v. Zavala, No.
05-30120, 2006 WL 914528, at *3, *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2006) (same); United States v.
Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (refusing to presume reasonable all
guideline sentences because such a presupposition would, in actuality, make the
Guidelines mandatory).
67. In United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006), the court
seemed to have adopted a presumption of reasonableness for within-range sentences by
"join[ing] several sister circuits in crediting sentences properly calculated under the
Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness." However, in United States
v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 2006), the court remarks dismissively of its
Williams holding that, "Although this statement seems to imply some sort of elevated
stature to the Guidelines, it is in fact rather unimportant," and then makes a series of
statements suggesting that whether a sentence is within the guidelines range is of no
particular consequence at all.
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programs ("fast-track departures") appear to remain in operation
largely unaffected by Booker.68 Therefore, the Commission is able to
collect pre- and post-Booker statistics about how often judges
sentenced inside and outside of the judicially determined guideline
range and also about what proportion of sentences outside the
range were sought or acquiesced in by the government. It thus
appears that one reasonable, if by no means perfect, measurement
of the effect of Booker on institutional sentencing discretion is the
change in percentage of sentences outside the applicable guideline
range-which for ease of reference will be called the "guidelines
compliance rate."
B. A Word About Data and Terminology
1. Data. This Article examines the sentencing data published
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission on federal sentences imposed
from January 13, 2005, the day after Booker was decided, through
December 21, 2005. That such an analysis is possible at all is due to
the Commission's commendable "Special Post-Booker Coding
Project," which, since the spring of 2005, has gathered, coded, and
published selected categories of sentencing information on cases
sentenced after Booker."5 This Article was written in late 2005 and
early 2006. Though the Commission continues to produce updated
data every few months, two considerations led me to focus on the
2005 data.7" The first was the need for closure in the face of a
publication deadline, coupled with the conclusion that a year of data
is a reasonable amount upon which to base provisional conclusions.
Second, even though the Commission continues updating the post-
Booker data, the additional cases so far reported for early 2006 do
not materially change the picture painted by the 2005 data. In a few
instances where available 2006 data from the "Post-Booker Coding
Project" seems suggestive, I have mentioned it.
After this Article was completed and in the midst of the
publication process, the Commission released a lengthy report (the
68. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (explaining these sentence
reduction methods and their availability).
69. All of the data compilations in the Special Post-Booker Coding Project are
available at http://www.ussc.gov/bf.htm. As this Article goes to press, the most recent
version collects data on all post-Booker cases sentenced and reported to the Commission
as of March 16, 2006. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT
1 & n.1 (2006), available at https://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker-033006.pdf
[hereinafter MARCH 2006 POST-BOOKER CODING] (data extraction as of March 16, 2006).
70. This Article is based primarily on the material collected through December 21,
2005. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 1 & n.1 (2006),
available at https://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker-010506.pdf [hereinafter DECEMBER
2005 POST-BOOKER CODING] (data extraction as of December 21, 2005).
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"Booker Report") on the impact of Booker on federal sentencing.7
The Booker Report covers a slightly longer period of time than does
this Article, addressing cases reported to the Commission through
mid-February 2006. Consequently, the figures in the Commission's
report will not exactly match the figures in this Article.72 Moreover,
while the report contains a great volume of interesting material,
with one notable exception relating to sentence severity,73 it adds
relatively little new information on the particular points under
examination here and will thus receive less attention in this Article
than it doubtless will in other venues.
One cautionary note about the data collected by the
Commission for 2005 should be sounded. The immediate post-
Booker period was chaotic and confusing for both the courts and the
Commission. Although the Commission acted with commendable
promptness in beginning its data collection effort so soon after the
Booker decision, that effort was understandably and quite
inevitably attended with difficulties. The courts were initially
uncertain how they were supposed to proceed at sentencing in light
of Booker, which led to considerable variation in actual practice.
Similarly, the Commission was unsure of what data could and
should be collected and of how to go about collecting it. For example,
it appears that a number of different reporting forms were
employed by the courts throughout 2005, and that judges and their
staffs may have been inconsistent in how (or even whether) they
completed and submitted the forms to the Commission.74 These
difficulties, as well as difficulties experienced by the Commission in
coding the information submitted on the forms," suggest that
71. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
booker.reportlBookerReport.pdf [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT].
72. The figures in this Article and the Commission's Booker Report will not match
exactly for one other reason. In compiling the data in the Special Post-Booker Coding
Project, the Commission elected to code only those cases that involved a single guideline
calculation. Cases with counts of conviction involving more than one guideline were
omitted from the project. See, e.g., DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 70,
at 15 n.3. However, the Commission then included all cases, regardless of the number of
guidelines involved, in its comprehensive post-Booker report. See BOOKER REPORT, supra
note 71, at D-4 n.1. Consequently, the Commission's comprehensive report covers a
slightly larger data set than does its special coding project. In general, the trends revealed
in the two different data sets are effectively identical, but the Commission's choice to use
different data sets in these two presentations is puzzling and produces some confusion.
73. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
74. Some of the reporting and data collection difficulties encountered by the
Commission and the courts in this period are described in the Commission's March 2006
report on the effects of Booker. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 71, at 38-40.
75. One point of particular concern is whether the Commission has accurately
distinguished departures or variances sought or acquiesced in by the government and
those awarded solely on the motion of the defense or on the court's own motion over the
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researchers and policymakers should view the Commission's
statistics as useful guides to general trends, but should avoid basing
important policy judgments on small statistical variations reflected
in the Commission's post-Booker data.
2. Terminology. At various points in this Article, the term
"guidelines compliance rate" or "compliance rate" is used to refer to
the percentage of cases sentenced within the otherwise applicable
guideline range. Several knowledgeable observers of federal
sentencing have raised concerns about the use of "compliance" in
this way."6 They point out, quite sensibly, that a sentence outside
the guideline range may be perfectly "compliant" with the scheme of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines inasmuch as the Guidelines
explicitly provide for departures both above and below guideline
ranges at the request of the parties or on the court's own motion.
They express concern that use of the term "compliance" implies that
outside-the-range sentences are illegitimate, an implication that
can be used to suggest that judges (and other parties) who award or
sanction departures are behaving illegitimately, even illegally.
Despite these concerns, for two reasons I have elected to retain
the term "compliance" in some places. First, it is difficult to think of
another single word that means "outside of the otherwise applicable
guideline range," or to fit the longer phrase in the heading of a
chart. Second, the term "guidelines compliance" conveys an
important idea. Considering the federal sentencing system as a
whole, the guideline ranges represent a norm, or set of norms, of
sentence severity, departure from which was supposed to be
relatively rare. Thus, I think it not unreasonable to characterize the
proportion of sentences within the guideline range, and thus
congruent with the norms established by the Guidelines, as a
measurement of compliance with those norms-a "compliance rate."
It is not a perfect measurement, because it includes many cases
that all would agree should fall outside the range. But it seems idle
to deny that a rise in the rate of non-guidelines sentences is at least
one indicator of decreased compliance with the Guidelines' norms.
That said, the use of the term "compliance rate" to describe the
percentage of outside-the-range sentences should not be construed
as expressing any view about the legitimacy of any particular
sentence or group of sentences.
objection of the government.
76. Professors Dan Freed and Doug Berman, as well as Judge Gerard Lynch, raised
this point in discussions of an earlier draft of this Article.
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C. Measuring and Explaining the Post-Booker Decline in
Guidelines "Compliance," as Measured by Fraction of Sentences
Within the Guidelines Range
The most statistically obvious fact about federal sentencing in
the year following the Booker decision is that compliance with the
Guidelines, as measured by the percentage of sentences imposed
within the applicable guideline range, has declined. During 2004,
about 72% of all federal sentences were within range." In the
eleven-month period of 2005 following Booker, the percentage of all
federal sentences within range dropped to 61.2%."8 Unfortunately,
standing alone, these numbers tell us very little. Does the changed
national average reflect a uniform national trend, or does it mask
considerable regional variation? Is a roughly 10% decline in
guidelines compliance a notable change in historical terms or
merely a normal statistical fluctuation? Why has compliance
dropped, or more particularly, whose behavior (that is, the behavior
of which sentencing actors) has caused the drop? Finally, is the
decline an intolerable devolution from a system of law to one of
disorderly discretion79 or an indication of relative continuity
between the pre- and post-Booker worlds? Answering these
questions requires teasing apart the aggregate national figures on
guidelines compliance.
77. The Sentencing Commission has published some sentencing statistics for fiscal
year (FY) 2004. Operating on the assumption that the Supreme Court's decision in
Blakely v. Washington, which raised but did not decide the question of the Guidelines'
constitutionality, might have affected sentencing behavior, the Commission has provided
tables that report pre- and post-Blakely sentencing data for FY 2004. Except where
specifically noted, all references below to sentencing statistics in 2004 refer to the
Commission's pre-Blakely data. In FY 2004, pre-Blakely, 72.2% of federal sentences were
within the guideline range; in the three months of FY 2004 after Blakely, 71.8% were
within range. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SELECTED 2004 SOURCEBOOK TABLES,
tbls.26 (pre-Blakely) & 26 (post-Blakely), available at https://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/
2004/selected_2004.pdf [hereinafter SELECTED 2004 TABLES].
78. DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 70, at 1. As of March 16,
2006, the rate of within-range sentences had increased slightly to 61.7%. MARCH 2006
POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 69, at 1. The Commission's Booker Report reflects a
within-range rate of 62.2%. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 71, at 62 tbl.1.
79. This appears to be the view of important elements of the Department of Justice.
For example, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales expressed concern about the decline in
within-range sentences in a speech to the National Center for Victims of Crime on June
21, 2005, and suggested that in consequence, the post-Booker advisory guidelines "must
be improved." See Alberto Gonzales, supra note 52. See also Becky Gregory & Traci
Kenner, A New Era in Federal Sentencing, 68 TEX. B.J. 796, 800, 803 (2005), in which the
authors, the First Assistant U.S. Attorney and the Appellate Chief for the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Eastern District of Texas, note the decline in within-range sentences to
61.7% as of August 3, 2005, and suggest this decline "portend[s] the return to a
sentencing system characterized by unfairness and inconsistency as predicted by Justice
O'Connor in her Blakely dissent." Id. at 800.
HeinOnline  -- 43 Hous. L. Rev. 297 2006-2007
298 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [43:2
1. All Sentencing Is Local. On one point at least the drop in
the national guidelines compliance rate is an accurate reflection of
the state of the entire federal system-the post-Booker decline in
within-range sentences was nearly universal. As Figure 1
illustrates, after Booker, the percentage of cases sentenced within
range dropped in every circuit. However, the national average
conceals the reality that the response to Booker differed markedly
in degree from region to region. After Booker, sentences imposed
within range declined by as little as 6.3% in the D.C. Circuit and as
much as 14.9% in the Ninth Circuit. Eight of the twelve circuits
experienced declines in the percentage of sentences within range
greater than the national average of about 10%. In the Second and
Ninth Circuits, a guidelines sentence became the exception rather
than the rule, with compliance rates declining below 50%. Only the
relatively modest declines in the case-rich Fifth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits"0 held the overall national rate of within-
guidelines sentences above 61%.
Figure 1: Change in Guidelines Compliance Rate
After Booker, by Circuit8 l
(% Sentences Within Range)
Circuit 2004 2005 Difference
DC 59.2 52.9 - 6.3
1A 79.6 64.8 - 14.8
2nd 63.8 49.5 - 14.3
3"d  62.6 51.3 - 11.3
4t 78.9 66.2 - 12.7
5t 80.2 70.7 - 9.5
6 69.7 57.6 - 12.1
7t 75.4 62.8 - 12.6
8t 77.0 64.7 - 12.3
9t 61.8 46.9 -14.9
10 73.9 65.9 -8.0
11h 74.7 67.9 - 6.8
80. For example, between January 12, 2005 and December 21, 2005, the Fifth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits processed 39.5% of all defendants entering pleas in federal
district courts. DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 70, at 16-18.
81. The data in the 2004 column are for the period of FY 2004 preceding the Blakely
decision. SELECTED 2004 TABLES, supra note 77, at tbl.26 (pre-Blakely). I have not
included the post-Blakely period of FY 2004 (between June 25 and September 30) in this
particular chart both because the lack of certainty during that period about whether the
Guidelines remained good law and the consequent uncertainty about the effects of Blakely
on judicial behavior and because the circuit-wide statistics for those three months do not
differ markedly from the nine months of FY 2004 preceding Blakely. Data in the 2005
column are drawn from DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOoKER CODING, supra note 70, at 16-18.
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The district data shows even greater variation in
responses to Booker. More than 90% of all districts reported
lower percentages of sentences within range after Booker, but
guidelines compliance in a few districts actually went up.82
Among the vast majority of districts in which compliance
declined, some experienced only minor drops,83 but in others
the change was dramatic. For example, in the Eastern District
of Wisconsin, the percentage of sentences within range fell
31.8% between 2004 and 2005, from 84.7% to 52.9%; the rate
in Massachusetts fell 28.1%, from 79.7% to 51.6%; compliance
in the Western District of Washington fell 27%, from 64.3% to
37.3%; and in the Southern District of Iowa, the decline was
27.1%, from 73.7% to 46.6%.84 And in at least a few districts,
the rate of guidelines compliance has become astoundingly
low. In 2005, within-range sentences accounted for only 40% of
the cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia), 37.7% of the cases in the District of Idaho,
34.9% of the cases in the Eastern District of New York, and
28.6% of the cases in the District of Arizona.85
2. Guidelines Compliance in Historical Context. As
striking as the foregoing figures may seem, they compare only
partial years before and after the Booker decision.88 They do
not reveal whether a 10% year-to-year change in the national
Guidelines compliance rate is significantly out of the ordinary,
nor do they tell us how the post-Booker rate of 61.2% of
sentences within range compares to the historical norm since
the advent of the Guidelines in 1987. Both questions are
answered in some measure by Figure 2 below.
82. Out of the ninety-four federal districts, ten (Maine, Delaware, Western
Pennsylvania, Virgin Islands, Northern Mississippi, Eastern Tennessee, Central
California, Eastern Oklahoma, Middle Alabama, and Northern Florida) registered an
increase in the percentage of sentences within range in the period of 2005 after Booker by
comparison with the period of FY 2004 preceding Blakely. Compare SELECTED 2004
TABLES, supra note 77, at tbl.26 (pre-Blakely), with DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER
CODING, supra note 70, at 16-18.
83. Nine of ninety-four districts experienced declines of 5% or less post-Booker in
the rate of cases sentenced within the applicable guideline range. Compare SELECTED
2004 TABLES, supra note 77, tbl.26 (pre-Blakely), with DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER
CODING, supra note 70, at 16-18.
84. Compare SELECTED 2004 TABLES, supra note 77, tbl.26 (pre-Blakely), with
DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 70, at 16-18.
85. DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 70, at 16, 18.
86. That is, the 2004 data is for the period of FY 2004 before Blakely, and the 2005
data is for the period of FY 2005 after Booker.
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Figure 2: Guidelines Compliance Rate87
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Figure 2 shows that the post-Booker decline in within-range
sentences was not merely a statistically unremarkable fluctuation.
Rather, the roughly 10% post-Booker drop was more than double the
largest previous year-to-year variation in rate of within-guidelines
sentences.88 Of course, given that Booker transformed the Guidelines
from a mandatory to an advisory system, it would be shocking if
there were not some decline in the degree of guidelines compliance.
Under the circumstances, the magnitude of the change may be
remarkable primarily for its relative modesty.
Indeed, many observers have been at pains to downplay the size
of the drop in guidelines compliance, emphasizing that the 61.2%
87. The data in Figure 2 are drawn from DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING,
supra note 70, at 7 (reporting guideline application trends for FY 2001, FY 2002, FY 2003,
FY 2004 pre-Blakely, FY 2005-06 post-Blakely through December 21, 2005); SELECTED
2004 TABLES, supra note 77, tbl.26 (providing FY 2004 post-Blakely); 2000 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 34, fig.G (reporting guideline application trends for 1996-2000); 1995 REPORT,
supra note 28, at 89 tbl.31; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 83 tbl.33
[hereinafter 1994 REPORT]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 161 tbl.66
[hereinafter 1993 REPORT]; 1992 REPORT, supra note 27, at 127 tbl.50. FY 2004 post-
Blakely data is shown on the bar designated 2004b and FY 2004 pre-Blakely is shown as
2004a.
88. The largest previous year-to-year change in rate of within-guidelines sentences
was the 4.4% increase from 2002 to 2003. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 tbl.26, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/table26.pdf [hereinafter 2002 SOURCEBOOK] (listing
the overall compliance rate for 2002 as 65%), with U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.26, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/table26.pdf [hereinafter 2003 SOURCEBOOK] (listing
the overall compliance rate for 2003 as 69.4%).
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rate of 2005 was only slightly lower than the rate prevailing as
recently as 1999-2002, 89 and arguing that the post-Booker sentencing
environment thus represents no significant change from the pre-
existing regime.90 While it is striking that the rate of compliance with
the post-Booker advisory system is only 3% to 4% lower than the rate
that prevailed during four of the seventeen years during which the
Guidelines were legally mandatory, critics of the post-Booker regime
would doubtless characterize the focused comparison between 2005
and 1999-2002 as fatally limited.
First, even if one knew nothing about the legal and political
history of federal sentencing over the last decade, the narrow focus on
2005 and 1999-2002 would obviously be misleading because it
ignores the fact that compliance rates were significantly higher both
before 1999 and during 2003-2004. Indeed, the average (mean)
annual rate of within-range sentencing for the period 1992-2004
exceeds 69%, markedly higher than the 2005 post-Booker rate of
61.2%.
Second, the argument that the post-Booker compliance rate is
acceptable because it is roughly comparable to the 1999-2002 rate
necessarily presupposes that the 1999-2002 rate was desirable, or at
least acceptable. However, as noted above, for a number of influential
figures in Congress and the Bush Justice Department, the
compliance rates prevailing in 1999-2002, far from being a desirable
norm, were evidence of creeping laxity verging on lawlessness on the
part of both federal sentencing judges and many U.S. Attorneys'
Offices. As Figure 2 illustrates, the rates of within-range sentencing
prevalent during 1999-2002 represent the trough in a compliance
curve that sloped steadily downward through the 1990s, reversed
direction soon after the Bush Administration took over the Justice
Department, and began to climb steeply upward during 2003 when
89. For example, Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, has consistently emphasized in public statements the relative modesty of
the post-Booker decline in within-range sentences. See Implications of the Booker/Fanfan
Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45-47
(2005) (statement of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission)
(noting that preliminary statistics available in February 2005 showed a rate of sentences
within range exceeding 63.9%). Judge Hinojosa expressed a similar view in his remarks at
the symposium that provided the occasion for this Issue.
90. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on United States v. Booker: One Year Later-Chaos
of Status Quo?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearing] (statement of James E. Felman, Partner, Kynes, Markman, & Felman, PA.)
(contending that post-Booker sentencing could best be characterized as "status quo").
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the PROTECT Act and ensuing Guidelines amendments limiting
departures were passed.9
3. Who Caused the Decline in Within-Range Sentences? Given
that the percentage of sentences imposed within the guideline range
has declined nationally since Booker, the next question is who is
responsible for the drop. Those unfamiliar with the details of the
federal sentencing system are likely to assume that the decline must
necessarily be the result of judges exercising their enhanced
discretionary power. And while that turns out to be substantially
correct, prosecutorial behavior has also played a role, and one can
only allocate responsibility for the changes in 2005 after carefully
analyzing the contribution of all the institutional actors.
Before Booker, certain types of departures from the otherwise
applicable guideline range were legally available only upon motion of
the government. The SRA mandated that downward departures from
a statutory minimum mandatory sentence based on a defendant's
cooperation with the government in the investigation or prosecution
of others-substantial assistance departures-required a
government motion." Though it need not have, the original
Sentencing Commission adopted this government motion
requirement into the Guidelines for departures below the low end of
a guideline range.93 Thus pre-Booker, a judge could not grant a
substantial assistance downward departure from either a mandatory
minimum or the low end of the applicable guideline range without
the affirmative, formal request of the government.94 Beginning in
2003, the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act authorized a
new kind of departure for defendants in high-caseload districts, so-
called "fast-track" departures.9' In districts designated by the
91. Note that one consequence of the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act was
the legitimization of fast-track departures under new section 5K3.1, which became
effective October 27, 2003. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 651
(2005). It is unclear how many of these departures were captured and properly classified
in FY 2003. By FY 2004, the Commission created a new statistical category for them, but
before reporting and data collection could become regularized, Blakely was decided in
June 2004. It is therefore somewhat difficult to determine the effect on compliance rates
of the PROTECT Act's legitimization of fast-track departures.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
93. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (2005).
94. For discussions of substantial assistance practice before Booker, see ROGER W.
HAINES, JR., FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III & JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1541-51 (2004); Bowman, supra note 36, at 13-16; SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE WORKING GROUP, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL COURT PRACTICES:
SENTENCE REDUCTIONS BASED ON DEFENDANTS SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
GOVERNMENT, reprinted in 11 FED. SENT G REP. 18, 28 (1998).
95. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m), 117 Stat. 650, 675.
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Attorney General, judges could depart downward up to four offense
levels for defendants who pled guilty very early in the process and
waived various trial and appellate rights.96 Fast-track departures
were likewise available only on motion of the government.97 In
addition, a good many departures based on neither substantial
assistance nor a fast-track program are endorsed by the prosecution
pursuant to a plea agreement. In such cases it would be inaccurate to
say that the government controls the decision about whether a
departure was available, but the reality is that government
endorsement of or acquiescence in a proposed departure is a major
factor in the judge's decision to grant or deny it.
It is difficult to determine precisely who was primarily
responsible for what fraction of sentences outside of the guideline
range in the period just before and after Booker. The difficulty flows
partly from the fact that the law and nomenclature concerning non-
guideline sentences changed three times between the beginning of
fiscal year (FY) 2003 and the close of FY 2005, and the Commission
changed its data collection and reporting practices several times in
the same period to keep up with developments. Before the PROTECT
Act, the Commission recognized three categories of departures for
reporting purposes: upward departures, substantial assistance
departures, and all other downward departures.99 The debate before
and after passage of the PROTECT Act about whether judges or
prosecutors were primarily responsible for what some viewed as
unacceptably high departure rates,99 together with the Act's creation
of the new category of fast-track departures, led the Commission to
begin examining cases with non-substantial assistance departures to
determine whether the departure was initiated or consented to by the
government. The data resulting from this coding effort was first
published as part of the Commission's report to Congress on
departures in 2003,00 and began appearing as a regular feature of the
96. For a more complete explanation of fast-track or early disposition programs, see
HAINES, BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 94, at 1684-86.
97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2005).
98. See, e.g., 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, fig.G, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf (breaking sentences into four categories:
within range, substantial assistance departures, other downward departures, and upward
departures).
99. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, When Sentences Don't Make Sense, WASH.
POST, Aug. 15, 2003, at A27 (noting that the proportion of cases in which the government
requests or acquiesces in departures equals or exceeds the proportion in which judges
depart without government approval); William W. Mercer, U.S. Attorney Dist. of Mont. &
James E. Felman, Partner, Kynes, Markman, & Felman, Testimony Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 6-7, 14-15 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at https://www.ussc.gov/
hearings/0819USSC.pdf.
100. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 60 fig. 15 (2003), available at
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Commission's data analysis in the Commission's 2003 Sourcebook of
Federal Sentencing Statistics.' Then, in June 2004, the Supreme
Court decided Blakely, which did not directly address the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines or departures from guideline ranges, but
created a wave of litigation and general uncertainty about all
aspects of guideline sentencing, including departures. In January
2005, Booker put the capstone on the general confusion by creating
an advisory system in which it was unclear whether a "departure"
remained a meaningful concept.
A year after Booker, although much remains uncertain, the
dust has settled somewhat. First, the departure concept remains
significant (at least so far). Because the Booker decision invalidated
only two sections of the SRA and left the Guidelines intact (albeit
advisory),1 2 the government motion requirement for sentence
reductions based on substantial assistance or participation in a fast-
track program appears to have survived largely unscathed. Thus
far, for example, every circuit to consider the question has upheld
the government motion requirement for substantial assistance
departures below a statutory mandatory minimum,103 and the
majority seem to have upheld the government motion requirement
for substantial assistance departures below the low end of a
guideline range.1M Likewise, it appears that government and
defense counsel continue to think it important to negotiate
agreements involving government motions for, or government
acquiescence in defense motions for, non-guideline sentences. The
continuing legal requirement of government motions for substantial
assistance and fast-track departures means that such motions are
still routinely made and granted and can be counted by the
Commission. Similarly, the practical importance of agreements
between the parties favoring non-guideline sentences means that
these agreements, too, continue to be made and continue to be
https://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf.
101. 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, tbls.25, 25A & 26A.
102. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005).
103. Booker does not apply to statutory mandatory minimum sentences.
Consequently, it does not affect the requirement of a government motion as a prerequisite
for a departure below a statutorily created mandatory minimum sentence. United States
v. Mullins, 399 F.3d 888, 889, 890 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005).
104. United States v. Ziesman, 409 F.3d 941, 956-57 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no error
in government's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion and implicitly holding that
such a motion is a prerequisite for a substantial assistance departure), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 579 (2005); United States v. Bermddez, 407 F.3d 536, 541, 545-46 (1st Cir. 2005)
(same), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 304 (2005); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182
(11th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Daniels, 147 Fed. App'x 869, 871 (11th Cir.
2005). But see United States v. Fernandez, No. 05-1596-CR, 2006 WL 851670 at *11-*12
(2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2006) (suggesting that district court may consider cooperation in the
absence of a government motion).
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counted by the Commission. Finally, the Commission's data
collection arm responded to Booker by creating a new statistical
category-the Booker "variance," which is a sentence below the
otherwise applicable guideline range that (1) was not sought or
sanctioned by the government as part of a substantial assistance
motion, approved fast-track program, or plea agreement, and
(2) was justified by the court at least in part by reference to some
factor that the Commission interpreted as constituting reliance on
the authority granted by Booker."'
As a result of all this legal and statistical upheaval, any
conclusions about institutional responsibility for non-guideline
sentences during the 2003-2005 period must be advanced with
caution. Nonetheless, some reasonable conclusions are possible.
First, both before and after Booker, the institution most
responsible for initiating sentences outside the guideline range has
been the Department of Justice. Figure 3A shows the total
percentage of cases sentenced outside the applicable guideline
range during 2003-2005 and the percentage of cases in each
category of non-guideline sentences for which data is available-
upward departures, substantial assistance departures, other
government-initiated departures, downward departures granted by
courts without government sanction, and Booker variances. Figure
3B aggregates the foregoing categories to compare the proportion of
non-guideline sentences for which judges and the government were
responsible. As Figure 3B illustrates, the ratios of government-
sponsored to court-sponsored sentences below the guideline range
during the 2003-2005 period were roughly 3-to-1 in 2003, 4-to-1 in
2004, and 2-to-1 in 2005.
Second, the Booker decision produced an immediate jump in
the percentage of defendants receiving judicially initiated (or at
least non-government-sanctioned) below-range sentences. The
proportion of defendants receiving such sentences more than
doubled from 5.2% in 2004 to 12.8% in 2005.
Third, the percentage of defendants receiving below-range
sentences sanctioned by the government also increased after
Booker, from 21.9% in 2004 to 24.4% in 2005.
Fourth, as illustrated in Figure 3C, during 2005, the proportion
of court-initiated departures declined, while the proportion of
government-initiated departures increased.
105. DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 70, at 11 n.3. In truth, the
footnotes describing how the Commission categorized cases as "variances" are quite
confusing. The description in the text of what the Commission did is based in part on the
text of the Commission's footnotes and in part on discussions with Commission staff.
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TOTAL OUTSIDE GUIDELINE RANGE 30.50% 27.90% 38.90%
Upward departures 0.80% 0.80% 1.70%
Substantial assistance departures 15.90% 15.50% 14.80%
Other government-initiated downward 6.30% 6.40% 9.60%departures
Court-initiated downward departures/variances 7.50% 5.20% 3.20%Booker variances 9.60%
Figure 3B: Cases Sentenced Outside Guideline Range
2003-2005107
2003 2004 2005
TOTAL OUTSIDE GUIDELINE RANGE 30.50% 27.90% 38.90%
Upward departures 0.80% 0.80% 1.70%
All government-initiated downward departures 22.20% 21.90% 24.40%
Court-initiated downward departures/variances 7.50% 5.20% 12.80%
Figure 3C: Sources of Departures/Variances
April 2005-December 200508






Court initiated dprt 14.4 12.7 13.5 13.1 13.1 13 12.8 1 2.8 12.7
Upward dp 1 1.8 j 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1 (data extraction as of December 21, 2005); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 1 (2005), available at https://www.ussc.gov/
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In sum, the number of non-guideline sentences increased
by 11.0% from 2004 to 2005. Of that increase, 0.9% were
upward departures, 2.5% were departures requested by the
government, and 7.6% were departures or variances initiated
by the judiciary. Thus, it is fair to say that the judiciary is
primarily responsible for the increase in the percentage of
below-range sentences that followed Booker, but the
government remains, by a roughly two-to-one margin, the
greatest institutional source of below-range sentences.
D. The Extent of Departure or Variance from the Guideline
Range
As important as the percentage of cases sentenced within
and without the applicable guideline range is to an assessment
of the post-Booker system, it is also important to assess the
degree of departure or variance from the Guidelines. For
example, one might view a situation in which a great many
sentences were imposed below the guideline range, but only by
a very small amount, quite differently than one in which
deviations from the Guidelines were both large in number and
substantial in degree. In truth, of course, the distinction
between substantial and minor deviations from the Guidelines
is largely in the eye of the beholder. All this Article can do is
present the available figures and attempt to place them in
historical context. Even this modest ambition is rendered more
difficult by the shifts in law and terminology during 2003-
2005 detailed above, and the fact that the Commission has not
yet published data on degree of departures for FY 2004. Figure
4 sets out the limited available data. It shows the median
Blakely/PostBooker_120105.pdf (data extraction as of November 1, 2005); U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, Special Post-Booker Coding Project 1 (2005), available at https://www.ussc.gov/
Blakely/PostBooker_101305.pdf (data extraction as of September 30, 2005); U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, Special Post-Booker Coding Project 1 (2005), available at
https://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_091505.pdf (data extraction as of September 1,
2005); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Post-Booker Coding Project 1 (2005), available at
https://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_082305.pdf (data extraction as of August 3,
2005); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Post-Booker Coding Project 1 (2005), available at
https://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_080805.pdf (data extraction as of July 12,
2005); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Post-Booker Coding Project 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker060605Extract.pdf (data extraction as of June 6,
2005); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Post-Booker Coding Project 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_5_26.pdf (data extraction as of May 5, 2005);
Memorandum from Linda Dragzga Maxfield, Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, to Judge Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, and Tim McGrath, Staff
Director, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, on Numbers on Post-Booker Sentencings: Data
Extract on April 5, 2005 (Apr. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/booker-041305.pdf.
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percentage decrease and the median decrease in months from
the bottom of the otherwise applicable guideline range. (The
blacked-out area for 2000-2002 reflects the fact that the
Commission did not divide non-substantial assistance
departures into court-initiated and government-initiated
departures in that period and thus comparison of 2000-2002
with 2003 and 2005 is impossible.)
Figure 4: Size and Degree of Variances and Departures
I f i It IM. ..ItI.. IiI I
2002 , 50.3% 27 16
20(! 1150.0% 253 17
2N0 2 50.0% 277 14
203 49.9% 26 28.1% 8 40.0% 12 39.3% 12
2005 49.9% 28 27.1% 9 34.0%109 12110 333% 14
The data in Figure 4, read in conjunction with the data in
Figure 3A above, suggests only modest conclusions. First, the
magnitude of both government-initiated and court-initiated
departures seems to have remained roughly constant before
and after Booker. There does not appear to be anything special
about the way either the government or district judges
approach the magnitude of deviations from the Guidelines in
the post-Booker world. The size of the median substantial
assistance departure remains at a bit over two years. The
median size of other government-initiated downward
departures has held at eight to nine months, and the median
size of a court-initiated downward departure or variance has
stayed flat at twelve months.
Second, we can therefore say that, in the year after
Booker, about 0.7% fewer defendants received multi-year
substantial assistance departures. About 3.2% more
109. This figure represents an approximation, though it should be accurate within
plus or minus 1%. The Commission's 2005 data splits court-initiated sentences below the
guideline range into two categories: "other downward departure[s]" and "otherwise below
guideline range." DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 70, at 21-22. The
median percentage decrease from the guideline range in cases with "other downward
departure[s]" is 34.2%. Id. at 21. The median percentage decrease from the guideline
range in cases "otherwise below guideline range" is 33.3%. Id. at 22.
110. Although the Sentencing Commission divided court-initiated sentences below
the guideline range, the median term decrease in both categories was twelve months. Id.
at 21-22.
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defendants received eight to nine month non-substantial
assistance departures sought by the government. And 7.6%
more defendants (a little over 4,000 of the 54,624 defendants
sentenced between January 12 and December 21, 2005)
received judge-initiated sentence reductions of a median
length of one year.
III. THE STATE OF SENTENCE SEVERITY AFTER BOOKER
Given that virtually all non-guideline sentences both
before and after Booker have been below the otherwise
applicable range, one would expect an increase in non-
guideline, below-range sentences to produce a decline in the
average length of sentences imposed in federal court. As of
December 21, 2005, that had not proven to be the case. To the
contrary, as Figure 5 illustrates, the average length of a
federal criminal sentence in 2005 stayed at 56 months, exactly
the same as it was in 2004, the year before Booker."' The
average sentence for drug trafficking stayed flat."' The
average immigration sentence declined by two months, and the
average fire-arms sentence by one month, while the average
theft or fraud sentence increased by two months."'
Figure 5: Average (Mean) Sentence Length of
Federal Defendants, 2000-2005 (In Months)1 4
ALL Drug
OFFENSES Trafficking Immigration Firearms Theft/Fraud
2000 50 72 36 53 14
2001 50 70 35 52 15
2002 71 30 53 16
2003 52 77 28 56 16
2004 56 i 83 29 59 19
2005 56 83 27 58 21
The picture presented as of December 2005 is modestly
complicated by the sentence severity data in the latest version
of the Post-Booker Coding Project, which compiles data
through March 16, 2006, and the Commission's Booker Report,
which analyzes data through February 22, 2006. The Coding
111. Id. at 15.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 13-15.
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Project data shows a slight decline in average sentence for all
offenses to 55 months,'15 while the Booker Report reflects a
slight increase to 58 months."6 The difference may be
accounted for by the fact that the Booker Report includes cases
with multiple guideline calculations, which may be on average
somewhat more serious than the cases involving only one
guideline reported by the Coding Project. Resolving the
inconsistencies in the Commission's reporting methods is
beyond the scope of this Article. It is nonetheless fair to say,
using either the Post-Booker Coding Project data or the larger
data set analyzed in the Booker Report, that average sentence
length stayed roughly constant in the year or so following
Booker.
How one views these figures depends very much on the
perspective one brings to them. One can argue that because
the average federal sentence length held steady from 2004 to
2005, Booker has effected no material alteration of federal
sentencing reality. However, if one considers the movement of
sentence lengths over the past decade or so in conjunction with
political and legal developments in the same period, a
somewhat different story emerges. As described above,
important Republican lawmakers and decisionmakers in the
Bush Justice Department concluded that in the Clinton years
enforcement of the Guidelines' rules had become too lax and
the sentencing process too lenient."7 Beginning in 2001, they
set out to reverse the trend and, by mid-2004, before the
Blakely-Booker earthquake began to rock the federal system,
they were apparently succeeding. The perceived problems of
prosecutorial and judicial guideline evasion seemed to be
yielding to treatment. For example, as shown in Figure 6, the
percentage of government-sponsored substantial assistance
departures had fallen to its lowest level in thirteen years.118
And as illustrated by Figure 2 above, from 2001-2004, the
overall rate of guidelines compliance increased by more than
8%.
1 1 9
115. MARCH 2006 POST-BOOKER CODING, supra note 69, at 15.
116. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 71, at 71 tbl.3.
117. See supra notes 42-46, 91 and accompanying text.
118. The data in Figure 6 are drawn from DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOoKER CODING,
supra note 70, at 7 (data for 2001-2005); 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 34, fig.G (data for
1996-2000); 1995 REPORT, supra note 28, at 89 tbl.31; 1994 REPORT, supra note 87, at 83
tbl.33; 1993 REPORT, supra note 87, at 161 tbl.66; 1992 REPORT, supra 27, at 127 tbl.50.
119. See supra text and figure accompanying notes 87-88.
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Moreover, the measures to control judicial and prosecutorial
discretion appeared to be having the desired effect on sentence
length. From 2001 to 2004, the average sentence for all federal
crimes increased by six months, or 12%.120 And this increase was not
driven by trends in a single crime type; average sentence lengths in
three of the four major federal crime categories-drugs, firearms,
and theft or fraud-increased substantially. From 2001 to 2004, the
average drug trafficking sentence increased by thirteen months, or
18.5%; the average firearms sentence by seven months, or 13.5%,
and the average theft or fraud sentence by four months, or a
whopping 27%.21 Only the length of immigration sentences
declined 122 and there is no indication that increasing the severity of
immigration penalties has been a priority of the Bush
Administration.
Careful examination of the available data suggests that the
increases in sentence length from 2000 to 2004 were not entirely
attributable to restrictions on the exercise of judicial and
prosecutorial discretion. For example, examination of the mix of
drug types prosecuted from the late 1990s through 2003 suggests
that, beginning in 2002, a marked increase in the proportion of
high-average-sentence methamphetamine cases combined with a
significant decrease in the proportion of low-average-sentence
marijuana cases contributed to the increase in the length of the
overall average drug sentence in this period. Figures 7 and 8 show
120. DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOoKER CODING, supra note 70, at 13-15.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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the movement of average sentence lengths within drug type, and
the change in drug type mix.
Figure 7: Average Sentence by Drug Type
11 3
(In Months)
98.0 121.0 111.0 80.0 50.0
96.5 123.1 106.0 72.3 45.4
94.1 133.4 93.1 76.2 46.5
89.4 130.7 102.1 63.6 43.1
83.6 125.4 97.2 61.0 42.1
82.2 125.0 95.1 59.0 39.0
79.3 122.4 96.8 58.1 37.0
79.1 120.3 88.8 61.6 33.7
77.0 119.5 87.8 63.2 36.4
77.0 115.0 88.5 63.4 38.0
78.2 119.3 93.5 62.7 32.9
80.6 123.0 96.3 63.0 33.9
123. The data underlying Figure 7 are drawn from the following sources: 2003
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, fig.J; 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, fig.J; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 81 fig.J
[hereinafter 2001 SOURCEBOOK]; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 34, at 81 fig.J; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 81 fig.J
[hereinafter 1999 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, fig.J [hereinafter 1998 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 81 fig.J
[hereinafter 1997 SOURCEBOOK]; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 56 fig.I; 1995
REPORT, supra note 28, at 110 fig.K & W; 1994 REPORT, supra note 87, at 115 fig.K; 1993
REPORT, supra note 87, at 144 fig.G.
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Figure 8: Number of Defendants per Major Drug Type 24
Although the Commission has not yet published the data for
2004-2005 that would be necessary to determine whether the trend
in drug case mix that began in 2002 continued through 2004-2005,
it is not unreasonable to suppose that this was the case. In any
event, the contribution of changing case mix to changing sentence
length deserves further investigation.
Similarly, the increase in average theft or fraud sentences that
began in 2001 and continued through the post-Booker year of 2005,
is surely related to the three rounds of statutory and Guidelines
amendments toughening sentences for many of these offenses,
beginning with the so-called "Economic Crime Package" of
Guidelines amendments in 2001125 and continuing through the
statutory and Guidelines amendments required by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.126 The Sentencing Commission's Booker Report
provides some data supporting the hypothesis that these statutory
and guidelines amendments were affecting sentence lengths in
2003-2004, and continued to do so in 2005.127 The Booker Report
also suggests that the severity of economic crime cases brought by
124. 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, fig.K.
125. For a discussion of the 2001 Economic Crime Package, see Frank 0. Bowman,
III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative
History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5 (2001).
126. For discussion of the sentencing provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
ensuing guidelines amendments, see Bowman, supra note 43.
127. BOoKER REPORT, supra note 71, at 73-74 (noting rise from 2003-2005 in
percentage of economic crime cases in which increased base offense level for fraud
offenses adopted after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was applied, and in percentage of cases in
which guidelines enhancement adopted in 2001 for number of victims was applied).
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the Justice Department from 2003-2005 progressively increased, at
least if severity is measured by the median loss amount involved in
each case. According to the Commission, the median loss amount in
economic crime cases increased "from $33,929 pre-PROTECT Act,
to $41,595 post-PROTECT Act, to $54,566 post-Booker."2 ' An
increase in median loss amount would tend to increase the
applicable guideline range.
Regardless of the fine points, it is difficult to dispute the
proposition that a variety of measures undertaken by Congress and
the Bush Justice Department-with the conscious objectives of
decreasing discretion of front-line sentencing actors, increasing
guidelines compliance, and increasing sentencing length-were
achieving their desired effects as of the Blakely summer of 2004.
Seen in this light, the 2004-2005 pre-Booker to post-Booker plateau
in average sentence length looks less like stasis than a check of the
movement to longer sentences that had been engineered and
nurtured by the dominant elements of Congress and the
Department of Justice.
IV. ASSESSING REGIONAL DISPARITY UNDER THE BOOKER ADVISORY
SYSTEM
The concerns of Congress and the Justice Department about
lower rates of guidelines compliance relate primarily to questions of
institutional control and sentence severity. However, the national
and regional figures on guidelines compliance raise at least one
issue for those concerned with achieving the goals of the SRA but
uninterested in preserving a high degree of congressional or
prosecutorial influence over sentencing outcomes. A primary
purpose of the SRA and the ensuing Guidelines was to reduce
unwarranted sentencing disparity. "Disparity" is a protean term in
the federal sentencing debate, '29 but it is clear that one objective of
the Guidelines was to impose at least rough parity on the sentences
ordered for similarly situated defendants sentenced in different
federal districts across the country.'
Intuitively, one would think that the substitution of advisory
guidelines in place of legally mandatory ones would produce greater
sentencing disparity from region to region, judge to judge, and
128. Id. at 74.
129. Studies of unwarranted disparity in federal sentencing have considered
differences between otherwise similarly situated defendants based on the identity of the
sentencing judge, the district or region in which cases are sited, race, ethnicity, national
origin, gender, and other issues.
130. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1988).
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defendant to defendant as a result of the relaxation of controls on
judicial sentencing discretion. At present, however, there is
insufficient data in the public realm to allow detailed analysis or
definitive conclusions regarding the effect of Booker on sentencing
disparity. Attempting to compare the degree of sentencing disparity
in two different sentencing systems or within the same system in
two different periods is a difficult and uncertain enterprise under
the best of circumstances. To do it properly requires detailed
sentencing data on each individual offender in the different systems
or periods being compared."' The Commission has not released such
data for the post-Booker period. One can, however, get some sense of
general trends at least in regional disparity by examining available
data that can stand in as a rough proxy for more precise measures.
For example, the difference in rates of guidelines compliance
between circuits or districts should be a decent rough proxy for the
degree of regional sentencing disparity. That is, it is not
unreasonable to assume, at least as a first-level approximation, that
two jurisdictions that adhere to the Guidelines at the same rate are
treating similarly situated defendants roughly equally. This
assumption is subject to some obvious caveats. For example, one
jurisdiction may consistently sentence within the guideline range
for marijuana cases, but not for crack cases, and another
jurisdiction may have precisely the reverse tendency, with the
result that, while their overall guidelines compliance rates might be
identical, the disparity of treatment between two classes of
similarly situated defendants sentenced in the two jurisdictions
would be stark indeed. Likewise, different jurisdictions have
different caseloads and different mixes of case types and may adopt
local practices of deviation from the Guidelines in response to local
conditions that affect only one or two categories of defendant. Even
with these caveats, comparing the rates of guidelines compliance
among circuits and districts probably tells us something about
regional sentencing disparity. This should be particularly true if one
considers trends over a period of years inasmuch as local case mixes
and the differing sentencing practices that may evolve in response
to them are unlikely to change dramatically from year to year.
Figure 9A shows the difference in percent between the circuits
with the highest and lowest guidelines compliance rates in each
131. Even working with complete data sets, judging relative disparity is difficult. For
exposure to several of the best extant efforts to do so, see James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R.
King & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999), and Paul J. Hofer et al., The
Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239 (1999).
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year from 1992 to 2005. Figure 9B shows the standard deviation
from the mean rate of guidelines compliance among circuits in each
year from 1992 to 2005. Figure 9C superimposes graphs of these
two statistics in a single visual representation.
32
Figure 9A. Difference Between Highest and Lowest
Compliance Rates Among Circuits
1992-2005
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005



















132. The data in Figures 9A-9C are derived from DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER
CODING, supra note 70, at 16-18; SELECTED 2004 TABLES, supra note 77, tbl.26; 2003
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, tbl.26; 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, tbl.26; 2001
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.26; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 34, tbl.26; 1999
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.26; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.26; 1997
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.26; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 41 tbl.26; 1995
REPORT, supra note 28, at 89 tbl.31; 1994 REPORT, supra note 87, at 83 tbl.33; 1993
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Standard Deviation --- Hi-Lo Difference
On the one hand, both the difference between the circuits with
the highest and lowest compliance rates and the standard deviation
from the mean compliance rate for all circuits increased slightly
following Booker. On the other hand, the Hi-Lo difference in 2005
was less than it had been in three previous years. And while the
standard deviation from the mean compliance rate was greater in
2005 than ever before, one standard deviation in 2005 was a mere
.226% greater than in 2002, and within one percentage point or less
of the figure in four other previous years.
District-level data points to the same ambiguous conclusion.
Figure 10 shows the standard deviation among guidelines
compliance rates of the ninety-four federal districts from 1996
through 2005.133 As with the circuit data, 2005 shows the largest
standard deviation in the series, but the difference between 2005
and the other years in the series is tiny. Moreover, a somewhat
more refined statistical comparison between the degrees of inter-
district variability in 2004 before Blakely and 2005 after Booker
133. The data underlying Figure 10 are derived from DECEMBER 2005 POST-BOOKER
CODING, supra note 70, at 16-18; SELECTED 2004 TABLES, supra note 77, tbl.26; 2003
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, tbl.26; 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, at 53 tbl.26; 2001
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, at 53 tbl.26; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 34, at 53 tbl.26;
1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, at 53 tbl.26; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, at 53
tbl.26; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, at 53 tbl.26; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31,
at 41 tbl.26.
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reveals that the difference in inter-district variability between these
two years is not statistically significant . Indeed, perhaps the most
striking thing about Figure 10 is the degree to which inter-district
variability stayed roughly constant over time. In short, although the
degree of guidelines compliance has varied widely from district to
district in any given year, that has been true for a long time, and
the degree of variation has fluctuated only modestly from year to
year in the last decade.
Figure 10: Standard Deviation in Guidelines










1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
The foregoing figures provide no clear indication that the post-
Booker regime is, or will in time prove to be, notably better or worse
than its predecessor in controlling regional sentencing disparity.
V. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
What, then, should we conclude from the available information
about post-Booker federal sentencing trends? Five points, at least,
seem reasonably clear, and I will add a sixth personal observation.
First, the time that has elapsed since Booker has been short
and the data on sentencing behavior in that period is, so far, either
incomplete or imperfectly reported and analyzed. Consequently, it is
reasonable to conclude both that the federal sentencing system is
still adjusting to its new advisory form and that we do not have a
134. An F-Test run comparing the variability of guidelines compliance rates among
districts in the pre-Blakely period of 2004 and the post-Booker period of 2005 yields a P
value of 0.392, indicating that the difference in variability between these two years is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
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complete picture of what it will look like if allowed to progress to a
state of post-Booker equilibrium. That said, we can make some
educated guesses about the probable shape of such an equilibrium
based on data on trends in guidelines compliance, sentencing
severity, and regional disparity.
Second, the effects of Booker, at least viewed at the national
level, have been strikingly modest-so far. This is not to say that
Booker has had no observable impact on sentencing practice and
outcomes. It has. Nonetheless, the norms of procedure and
substance engrained by years of practice under the mandatory
Guidelines have proven surprisingly durable. If the Booker regime
of advisory Guidelines is not displaced by legislation, it seems
reasonable to predict that the Guidelines will remain the
predominant factor in determining individual sentences for years to
come. Of course, if legislation is not immediately forthcoming and it
were to become clear that no legislation was in prospect for the
foreseeable future, it also seems reasonable to predict that there
would be a slow decay in guidelines compliance, although one
cannot know how long that decay would continue or how far it
would progress.
Third, precisely because Booker has had such relatively modest
immediate consequences, the interpretations placed on the
available information are likely to exemplify the adage that "where
you stand depends on where you sit"-with some (including the
Justice Department and some members of Congress) claiming that
the sentencing sky has fallen, or will do so shortly, and thus that
immediate remedial legislation is required, and others (including
many in the judiciary and the defense bar, and other members of
Congress) maintaining that things are pretty much the same as
they always were and therefore that we should continue to watch
and wait.
Fourth, how one views the data depends in large part on
whether one focuses on the magnitude of observable trends or on
their direction. It is one thing to say that guidelines compliance has
declined only to levels comparable to those prevailing earlier in the
Guidelines era. It is another to recognize that the post-Booker drop
in compliance not only took compliance to a historic low, but
reversed a strong recent trend in the opposite direction. Likewise, it
is one thing to observe that sentence severity stayed roughly flat
from 2004 to 2005, and another to note that this flattening cut short
a movement toward higher sentences and arguably frustrated the
objectives of those in the Justice Department and Congress who
were consciously engineering that movement.
Fifth, one's perspective on post-Booker developments is likely
to differ depending on whether one sees them from a national or
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local perspective. This will be particularly true, I suspect, on the
question of adherence to the Guidelines by the judiciary. Given that
Booker transformed the Guidelines into an advisory system, a 10%
decline in the national rate of within-range sentences driven
primarily by a 7% increase in judicial departures or variances is
unsurprising. Viewed nationally it ought not be that alarming, even
to those most interested in keeping departures down and sentences
up. Indeed, the curious combination of a declining guideline
compliance rate and a flat (or, if the Commission's Booker Report
data is to be believed, slightly increased) average sentence strongly
suggests that judges as a class are deeply reluctant to depart very
far or very often from Guidelines norms and that prosecutors as a
class have many tools for increasing sentence length when that is
their aim. However, this Olympian perspective may not carry the
day among prosecutors and others concerned with limiting judicial
sentencing discretion.
The Justice Department, in particular, does not experience the
post-Booker world in terms of aggregate national statistical trends.
The eyes, ears, and other sensory organs of the Department are its
Assistant U.S. Attorneys, whose conclusions about Booker and
ultimate recommendations to national departmental policymakers
will be based on their local, personal experiences. Whatever the
national statistical averages may be, the voices that will sound
loudest in departmental councils will be those of prosecutors from
the districts where Booker has already led to marked drops in
guidelines compliance. In the end, it may not matter that the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits have largely adhered to the Guidelines. In the
Department's view, high rates of guideline compliance and
concomitantly high degrees of prosecutorial influence over pleas and
sentences are, or at least should be, the unremarkable norm. It is
the fact that circuits like the Second and Ninth are now so far off
the Guidelines reservation that will cause consternation. Put
another way, what is most likely to drive the Justice Department is
its perception of what it has lost, and not what it has held onto. This
assessment of the Justice Department's mindset may account for its
decision in March 2006 to advocate legislation designed to achieve
de facto restoration of the pre-Booker status quo in the form of so-
called "topless" or "minimum" guidelines.'35
I close with a final personal observation. The frame of reference
of this Article has, to this point, been what I perceive to be the
135. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 90 (statement of William M. Mercer, U.S.
Attorney for the District of Montana); see also Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 6,
at 194-96 (explaining "topless guidelines" and other possible post-Booker remedial
legislation).
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realpolitik of contemporary federal sentencing. That is, we are
operating in a highly politicized, institutionally imbalanced
environment in which influential elements in Congress and the
Administration perceive ever-more-stringent sentences to be both
substantively and politically desirable, and judicial sentencing
discretion to be a challenge both to congressional authority over
sentencing rulemaking and to prosecutorial authority over
sentencing outcomes."' In this environment, the default assumption
of important voices in Congress and the executive branch is that a
material decrease in either the rate of guidelines compliance or the
overall length of federal criminal sentences is both bad policy and a
gesture of institutional defiance from the federal judiciary.
Let me suggest an alternative, moderate, and I think more
sensible reading of the post-Booker Year of Jubilee. The drafters of
the SRA never entertained the illusion that the Sentencing
Commission, or indeed Congress itself, was omniscient or that the
sentencing levels selected by those bodies would necessarily be
"right." Rather, everyone understood that the Commission would do
the best job it could in selecting sentencing levels and would
thereafter rely on feedback from the judges and lawyers who
operated the sentencing guidelines system, in addition to the
guidance of Congress and the input of its own experts, to adjust the
Guidelines over time. Some of this feedback would come in the form
of formal commentary from individuals and groups, but the primary
mode of feedback would be the behavior of those applying the
Guidelines to real cases. Since 1987, the idea that feedback from
front-line sentencing actors is an important component of the
federal sentencing model has somehow been lost. Instead, for a
variety of reasons related to the interplay of politics, the structure of
the Guidelines, and institutional competition for control of criminal
justice policy, sentences outside the otherwise applicable guideline
range have come to be viewed as illegitimate, even deviant. If we
could recapture for a moment the original spirit of the Guidelines
and listen to what the professionals who operate the federal
criminal justice system have told us through their conduct in 2005,
we might learn something important.
In that spirit, consider four facts about 2005. First, in 2005, the
majority of all federal judges were appointed by Republican
presidents37 and the U.S. Department of Justice was in the hands
136. For further discussion, see Bowman, Time Machine, supra note 6.
137. As of April 2005, Republican appointees constituted a majority of the judges on
ten of the nation's thirteen federal courts of appeals. Warren Richey, Conservatives Near
Lock on U.S. Courts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0414/p0ls02-uspo.html. As of September 2004,
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of a Republican Administration. Second, in 2005, prosecutors
initiated sentences below the guideline range twice as often as did
judges. Third, in 2005, prosecutors as well as judges sought
sentences below the guideline range more often than they had in
2004.8 Fourth, during 2005, in an advisory sentencing guidelines
system operated by a predominantly Republican judiciary and a
markedly conservative Republican Justice Department, almost 40%
of all sentences were outside the guideline range and the ratio of
sentences below the applicable guideline range to those above it was
roughly 22-to-1.
139
These facts about the post-Booker experience reinforce
conclusions many observers have reached about federal sentencing
throughout the Guidelines era. First, the behavior of the careful,
cautious, public-safety-conscious judges and prosecutors who run
the federal criminal justice system shows that they will obey the
law, but also strongly suggests that they believe the severity of
sentences called for by the Guidelines is often (though by no means
always) greater than necessary to achieve the ends of justice.
Second, the high severity levels that characterize the federal system
can only be maintained by unremitting efforts at central control of
the federal criminal process. The experience of the Clinton period
demonstrated that relaxation of central control produced a slow,
steady decline in guideline compliance and sentence severity driven
by the behavior of both judges and prosecutors. 40 The Bush
Administration and some in Congress set out to reverse that trend
by re-imposing central control through legislation, Guidelines
amendments, and directives from the central administration of the
Justice Department to U.S. Attorney's Offices. The counter-
revolution worked, at least until Booker was decided and the
strictures of central control were relaxed. Once that happened, the
upward curve of increased guidelines compliance reversed direction,
and the upward trend in sentence severity plateaued. It is,
therefore, fair to conclude from the experience of the Clinton years
and the post-Booker year of 2005, that, under the existing federal
guidelines system, whenever the amount of sentencing discretion
Republican appointees to the district court bench outnumbered Democratic appointees
356 to 310, a ratio that has obviously tilted further toward Republicans in the ensuing
year-and-a-half. Greg Gordon, All Eyes on Aging Justices, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 27,
2004, available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/story/10892870p-11810491c
.html; see also Adam Nagourney, Richard W. Stevenson & Neil A. Lewis, Glum Democrats
Can't See Halting Bush on Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at 1.
138. See supra fig.3B.
139. Id. In 2005, 37.1% of all cases were sentenced below the guideline range, while
1.7% were sentenced above the range, a ratio of 21.82-to-1.
140. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 39, at 554-58.
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available to judges and prosecutors increases, the proportion of
sentences below the guideline range increases and the severity of
the sentences the system would otherwise generate moderates.
What practical lesson flows from this conclusion? The simplest
lesson is that we have a federal sentencing system with a severity
level that, at least for some common offenses, is pegged higher than
the day-to-day judgments of the legal professionals who operate it
will support. I do not suggest that most front-line actors perceive
current sentence severity levels to be unjust (though some surely
do), only that the behavior of judges, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers demonstrates that they commonly perceive the sentences
called for by strict application of the Guidelines to be, at the least,
unnecessary. Because the severity level of the system is so
consistently at odds with the professional judgments and
institutional goals of its front line actors, only tight centralized
controls can keep it propped up. Those tight central controls in turn
breed evasion and institutional conflict.
If one is willing to grant that the judgment of front-line
sentencing actors is entitled to considerable deference when making
sentencing rules, one component of any post-Booker reform proposal
should surely be a serious, bipartisan, interbranch, and
interdisciplinary reexamination of at least those sentencing levels
and Guidelines' rules most productive of evasion by the front-line
actors who know the system best. I recognize that in some quarters
such a suggestion will be immediately dismissed as the soft-headed
maundering of an unworldly academic. But having spent more than
thirteen years as a federal and state prosecutor avidly seeking to
lock up the criminal element, I can bear that sort of critique with
equanimity. A more telling criticism is that, in the current political
environment, any hint that any federal sentencing law should be
revised downward is pure wishful thinking, a dream foredoomed.
That is a fair point. And I confess that as I write this concluding
paragraph, the title track of The Man of La Mancha"' keeps welling
up unbidden in the back of my mind. But whether it be tilting at
windmills or not, someone needs to remind federal policymakers of
an obvious truth-if laws are widely and persistently evaded by the
very officials assigned to enforce them, at some point one should
start questioning the wisdom of the laws rather than the fidelity of
the enforcers. In the end, one very good way to promote guidelines
compliance is to write guidelines that call for outcomes those who
run the system are happy to accept.
141. MAN OF LA MANCHA (MGM 1973) (musical version of the classic work, MIGUEL
DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA (1605)).
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